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Abstract 
The Artificial Intelligence paradigm (hereinafter referred to as “AI”) builds on the analysis of data able, 
among other things, to snap pictures of the individuals’ behaviors and preferences. Such data represent 
the most valuable currency in the digital ecosystem, where their value derives from their being a 
fundamental asset in order to train machines with a view to developing AI applications. In this 
environment, online providers attract users by offering them services for free and getting in exchange 
data generated right through the usage of such services. This swap, characterized by an implicit nature, 
constitutes the focus of the present paper, in the light of the disequilibria, as well as market failures, that 
it may bring about. We use mobile apps and the related permission system as an ideal environment to 
explore, via econometric tools, those issues. The results, stemming from a dataset of over one million 
observations, show that both buyers and sellers are aware that access to digital services implicitly implies 
an exchange of data, although this does not have a considerable impact neither on the level of downloads 
(demand), nor on the level of the prices (supply). In other words, the implicit nature of this exchange 
does not allow market indicators to work efficiently. We conclude that current policies (e.g. transparency 
rules) may be inherently biased and we put forward suggestions for a new approach.  
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1. Introduction 
The whole AI paradigm builds on the analysis of data mostly generated by individuals and then used to 
train machines (supervised, semi-supervised and unsupervised machine learning). Data stemming from 
the individuals’ behaviors and preferences (be it of a personal nature or not) therefore represent one of 
the most valuable “currency” in a data-hungry digital ecosystem featured to a large extent by AI 
applications. 
A problem arises relating to the collection of such data, which revolves around the implicit nature of 
transactions involving, on the one hand, services offered by platforms and, on the other hand, data ceded 
by individuals. The present contribution focuses on this relation that shapes market outcomes, in terms 
of economic and social (static and dynamic) efficiency. 
The emerging digital economy is characterized by a “data-driven” business model (Delmastro & Nicita, 
2019), which is devised to create value via data aggregation and analysis which, in turns, are made possible 
by the individuals’ choice to cede their own data (or to allow their collection) in exchange for services 
offered by platforms (see the definition below). The whole model therefore relies upon the implicit swap 
of data for services and this, in addition to a wide array of (positive and negative) externalities and lock-
in effects for the consumer, can result into further market failures. 
With reference to the mentioned data-related transactions, it is worth noting that some literature 
addresses indeed privacy not as an absolute right of the individual, but rather as a “sphere” subject to 
economic dynamics; in this sense, privacy can be conceived as a commodity, implying relevant trade-offs 
and therefore encompassing cost-benefit evaluations by the individual (for the notion of privacy as a 
commodity, see Bennett; Davies (Bennett, 1995; Davies, 1997)). 
Although any data transfer can theoretically be equaled to an exchange of goods in terms of relevant 
dynamics and individual’s assessments, it is nonetheless not accurate to place such transactions on the 
same level, as it is extremely difficult in practice for the individual to determine the real economic value 
of the data they provide. 
The above-mentioned approach to privacy as a commodity has triggered a heated debate [see (Cohen, 
2000)] with respect to the notion of individuals’ bounded rationality. As a matter of fact, when individuals 
provide their consent to transfer their data, they perform an evaluation in terms of cost-benefit, similar 
to the one carried out in relation to every purchase decision. However, when making decisions concerning 
whether providing their own data to an online subject, hence when defining their digital behaviors (i.e. 
consuming or not a digital service vis à vis a certain privacy policy being applied by online players) the 
individuals’ reasoning  is aimed at understanding whether it would be convenient to provide their 
personal information in exchange for benefits of another nature (economic or not). Such weighing in 
exercise is carried out in a context where users of online digital services do not avail of all the information 
necessary to measure the costs they will actually bear (uncertain as well as potential ones) because the 
environment in which they are immersed makes it difficult to thoroughly carry out evaluations as such. 
In this context, furthermore characterized by transactions that are not explicitly evident to digital users 
(i.e. “implicit transactions”), evaluations on the exchange of data for services of other nature are affected 
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by the individuals’ limitations in terms of capacity to define the marginal value of the non-monetary, 
incremental benefits «in relation to the focal product or its price» (Acquisti & Grossklags, 2005, 2008b). 
Such constraints, sharpened by incomplete information, information asymmetry and bounded rationality 
(Akerlof, 1970; Arrow, 1958; Simon, 1955), force individuals to conduct evaluations about the outcomes 
of data transfers in exchange for non-monetary and often intangible assets (mostly services) in a context 
marked by uncertainty and a high level of complexity. This affects the individuals’ assessment of the 
relevant consequences, hence their probability of occurrence «since the states of nature may be unknown 
or unknowable in advance» (Acquisti & Grossklags, 2008a). 
The digital environment is featured indeed by exogenous and endogenous components which make an 
evaluation difficult, starting with uncertainty, which constitutes the first element influencing the 
individuals’ choice. Together with their own preferences in relation to the data transfer itself, individuals 
are indeed called to cope with the uncertain nature of the trade-offs implied by online transactions. 
Moreover, due to the technological progress and to the ever more pervasive data collection practices 
implemented, asymmetric information further increases. As a matter of fact, the emergence of the data 
economy paradigm makes data collection almost imperceptible – if not invisible – to the user, who 
therefore has limited awareness of how much data is being collected about him/her, what kind of data 
he/she is actually ceding to platforms in order to access certain services, how the acquired data will be 
used and with what consequences. This recalls the Acquisti “blank check” metaphor (Acquisti, 2010, p. 
15,16). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide a conceptual framework, 
which constitutes the backdrop to the analysis. In Section 3, we illustrate the study design of our empirical 
analysis aimed at studying the (implicit) transactions between consumers and online operators. In Section 
4, we present the results from econometric models’ elaborations, relying on millions of data on mobile 
apps. Lastly, Section 5 provides our conclusions together with potential policy implications. 
2. Conceptual framework  
Setting aside for the moment the non-proper transactional nature of the relations at stake, the context in 
which individuals adopt their own data-related decisions in exchange for online services is shaped by 
information asymmetry and bounded rationality. 
The traditional landmark trait describing rationality in economic terms was long considered to be the 
consumers’ goal of maximizing their expected utility. In the wake of the introduction of the notion of 
“bounded rationality”, Kahneman and Tversky have shown instead logical inconsistencies in individuals’ 
preferences with respect to the axiom of rationality, showing how preferences are influenced by framing, 
hence by the alternative options’ formulation (Kahneman & Tversky, 1986), and then by reference dependence 
and prospect theory (Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). 
With respect to reference dependence, Kahneman and Tversky have shown how individuals evaluate 
outcomes taking a point as a refence (reference point) in order to classify gains and losses (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1991). Starting from this assumption, Adjerid, Acquisti, Brandimarte, and Loewenstein 
(2013), providing individuals with information about the subsequent use of their data acquired in a digital 
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environment, have shown that their preferences concerning data transfer can change, to the point that 
identical privacy notices do not always lead to the same level of data disclosure. Plunged in a universe 
featured by elements to which they cannot assign a value, individuals appear unable to figure out the 
probability of occurrence of a given event, nor the consequences of their actions. 
Starting from the ’80s, numerous theories have shown – in different contexts – a deviation from the then 
consolidated economic concept of rationality [e.g. (Benartzi & Thaler, 1995)]. In our paper, we make 
reference to the digital dynamic of data ceded by individuals in exchange for services of other nature, in 
order to pinpoint the by now nuanced concept of rationality in the individuals’ economic choices and to 
accordingly show how individuals make “no rational” choices in the data society context. 
In the digital environment, individuals’ choices on data transfer are affected indeed by incomplete and 
asymmetric information (Akerlof, 1970) due to the fact that online digital users have often no idea of the 
amount of data really gathered by online players, nor of the way how such data will be used, or to whom 
they could be sold. Individuals are not in a position to foresee the short-term uses, nor the prospective 
treatments which data ceded by them could be subject to.  
Due to the complexity inherent to the current information society, and to the mentioned individuals’ 
bounded rationality, data subjects are forced to make use of simplified models to decrypt the digital 
reality, while the presence of heuristics would challenge rational decision-making logics also in a 
hypothetical condition of complete information (in the light of cognitive anomalies).  
Furthermore, the emergence of a new awareness in digital users with respect to the intrinsic value of their 
data and to data ceding-related risks remains weak, due to the perceived underlying non-transactional 
nature of the data transfer. Due to the implicit nature of digital transactions in an online environment, 
individuals do not manage to assign an economic value to the data that they are about to cede, let alone 
to compare them with services obtained in return, or to weigh up the risks connected to their choices, 
assigning a probability of occurrence to their consequences. The nature of the elements involved in such 
“swap” therefore differs to the point that individuals cannot attach a proper value to their data, as they 
do not perceive the transactional nature of the situation they experience. Having no alternatives or valid 
reference points to break up this “loop”, individuals impulsively cede their data, accepting almost any 
conditions imposed on them by platforms, which already amounts to a market failure. 
If uncertainty related to incomplete information and information asymmetry could lead to a low risk 
perception (again, considering how both bounded rationality and cognitive anomalies could affect 
choices also in a context characterized by complete information), it is possible to affirm that, given the 
impulsive choices adopted when they exchange data ignoring some of the variables that come into play, 
individuals share some of the biases with subjects affected by “gambler's fallacy”, jumping to hasty 
conclusions and making a bet on their data, thinking that transactions would always turn to their 
advantage. 
The present contribution intends to analyze how all the elements featuring the constrained individual’s 
rationality, together with the misperception concerning the transactional nature of end-users’ online 
digital choices as to the use of their data, drive to inefficient market outcomes. 
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We study this relation in an empirical setting – i.e. mobile apps and the related permission system – which 
provides us with an ideal testbed. As a matter of fact, the apps permission system is currently the most 
transparent and standardized form of data exchange in the digital ecosystem. Indeed, permissions, on the 
one hand, inform consumers on the nature of individual data that will be gathered by online operators 
(see infra) and, on the other hand, they represent the finalization of a transaction between the two parties 
(data and money in exchange for online services). Of course, this system does not provide all the 
information needed by consumers with a view to making their decisions. However, it constitutes an ideal 
benchmark to test our framework. In fact, all the other systems are less informative, so that results from 
this “natural experiment” are inherently biased towards a more efficient outcome. In other words, we 
study the data exchange relation between consumers and online operators by placing ourselves in the 
worst possible condition to verify the existence of market failures. In the next paragraph, we illustrate 
our empirical setting in detail.  
3. Empirical Analysis 
3.1 Study design 
As already said, the aim of our research is to analyze the data transactions between consumers and digital 
operators. To this end, we focus on the apps permission system. As a matter of fact, the permission 
system is a formal environment which offers a framework within which individuals cede data in exchange 
for digital services (i.e. mobile apps).  
All the findings about apps permissions which are proposed in the present paper are based on a dataset 
containing data from about 1,135,700 apps (offered on the Android Google Play Store) which have been 
collected through crawling techniques (see also AGCOM, 2018)1.  
Permissions can be clustered based on the amount and nature of the costumers’ information they collect. 
In this sense, we can distinguish between permissions that can have an impact in the wider terms of data 
collection in general (they would gather whatever data stemming from users’ behaviors), and permissions 
which require access and usage of the user’s digital data in order to ensure the proper functioning of the 
application.  
In the light of such differentiation, the present paper makes reference to permissions categorizations 
emerged in part of the literature. In this respect, the Pew Research Center (2014) groups apps permissions 
into two categories: those which access to device hardware and those that access to various types of user 
information2. In particular, the latter allow to gather a greater amount of individual data, which are often 
irrelevant with a view to the proper functioning of the app. Another interesting classification is the one 
                                               
1 Crawler architecture refers to the copying process of web contents (data) following links to reach numerous pages through 
which it was possible to gather information on apps present on the Android Google Play Store. The collection of data and 
information was carried out by the Department of Computer, Control, and Management Engineering, University “La 
Sapienza”, Rome We gratefully acknowledge A. Vitaletti and A. De Carolis (see also Agcom, 2018).  
2 Pew Research Center (2015), Apps Permissions in the Google Play Store, www.pewinternet.org 
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proposed by Kummer and Schulte (2016), who – building on a previous classification put forward by 
Sarma et al. (2012) – identify a limited number of apps permissions as critical in terms of sensitive data. 
Finally, we use a more technical classification adopted by Google itself.3 
Referring to the 10 most widespread apps permissions, Table 1 summarizes whether these permissions 
are considered as sensitive – according to the Pew Research and Kummar and Schulte classifications – 
in terms of digital footprints left by the users in the virtual environment, and whether they should be 
considered as dangerous or normal according to the Google classification. 
Table 1: Classifications of apps permissions with a view to individual data 
Permission type and name The permission… Pew Center  Kummer & Schulte Google 
full network access 
“INTERNET” 
Allows applications to create 
network sockets and use 
custom network protocols. 
Yes No Normal 
view network connections 
“ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE” 
Allows applications to access 
information about network 
connections such as which 
network exist and are 
connected. 
No No Normal 
Read exsternal storage  
“READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE”              
“WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE” 
Allows an app to access to 
read from an external storage. Yes No Dangerous 
Write external storage 
Allows an app to access to 
write on an external storage. 
Any app that declares the 
“write external storage” 
permission is implicitly 
granted the permission to 
read also. 
Yes No Dangerous 
read phone status and identity 
Permission group: “PHONE”, which includes: 
• “READ_PHONE_STATE”; 
• “READ_PHONE_NUMBERS”; 
• “CALL_PHONE”; 
• “ANSWER_PHONE_CALLS”; 
• “ADD_VOICEMAIL”; 
• “USE_SIP”. 
group allows access to the 
device identifiers. 
“Read_phone_state”, e.g., 
allows the access to the 
phone state, including the 
phone number of the device, 
current cellular network 
information, the status of any 
ongoing calls, and a list of 
any PhoneAccounts. 
registered on the device  
Yes Yes Dangerous 
prevent device from sleeping 
“WAKE_LOCK” 
Allows using PowerManager 
WakeLocks to prevent 
processor from sleeping or 
screen from dimming. 
No No Normal 
view WI-FI connections 
“ACCESS_WIFI_STATE” 
Allows applications to access 
information about Wi-Fi 
networks. 
Yes No Normal 
precise location GPS and network-based 
“ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION” 
Allows an app to access 
precise location access precise 
location from location 
Yes Yes Dangerous 
                                               
3 For further information see: https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/overview 
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sources such as GPS, cell 
towers, and Wi-Fi. 
control vibration 
“VIBRATE” 
Allows access to the vibrator. No No Normal 
 approximate location network-based 
“ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION” 
Allows an app to access 
approximate location derived 
from network location 
sources such as cell towers 
and Wi-Fi. 
Yes Yes Dangerous 
The 1,135,700 apps composing the dataset overall contain 266 “unique” permissions.4 It should also be 
stressed that a considerable number of permissions, as described above, refers to technical aspects 
enabling the proper functioning of the apps. As an example, should a developer want to design a mapping 
app, it would be necessary to provide this with the right permissions, hence ensuring its access to GPS 
sensors-related data on the device on which the app will be installed. 
Figure 1 shows the permissions distribution among apps: only 10 out of 266 permissions are used by 
more than 20% of the surveyed apps. A considerable amount of permissions is therefore used by few 
applications; 20 out of these permissions are used only by 20 apps. The “long-tail” theory could be also 
applied to the permissions’ distribution (Anderson, 2006). 
Figure 1: Permission distribution 
 
 
                                               
4 Android’s development platform, the platform for developing apps for the Google Play Store, allows developers to envisage 
also new types of permissions or to replace some of them. In such case, new aspects linked to sector evolution might come 
up (emerging technologies, new types of apps), which might prompt the need for new types of permissions. 
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The ten most required permissions
1) full  network acces 82.1%
2) view network connections                                             71.5%
3) read the contents of your USB storage                        55.2%
4) modify or delete the contents of your USB storage  54.7%
5) read phone status and identy                                        32.8%
6) prevent device from sleeping                                        28.5%
7) view WI-FI connections                                                   25.8%
8) precise location (GPS and network-based)                 23.2%
9) control vibration                                                              21.8%
10) approximate location                                                    21.0%
266 single permission
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3.2 Qualitative findings  
Descriptive statistics provide useful preliminary information on the phenomenon at stake. As for the 
price variable (Table 2), the distribution of apps in the market is extremely asymmetric: 86% of them can 
indeed be downloaded for free, while only 0.5% – precisely 5.171 apps – has a price above 10 euros. 
Table 2: apps distribution by price range 
  Number of apps % 
free 977,244 86.05 
price>0 158,456 13.95 
0-0.99 € 65.676 5.8 
1-1.99 € 46.882 4.1 
2-4.99 € 33.415 2.9 
5-9.99 € 7.312 0.6 
≥10€ 5.171 0.5 
Total 1,135,700 100 
The fact that an app can be downloaded for free does not prevent the user from deciding, at a following 
stage, to take advantage of the in-app purchase service, allowing him/her to obtain additional services 
(so called in-app purchase), upon payment of a given amount of money.  
Comparing the average number of permissions between free and paid apps (i.e. Table 3), it emerges that 
free apps require a statistically significant higher number of permissions (on average, 6.4) than the paid 
ones (on average, 3.8). 
Table 3: average number of permissions, a comparison between paid and free apps 
  # of apps %  average # of permissions 
Free apps 977,244 86% 6.4* 
Paid apps 158,456 14% 3.8* 
Total apps 1,135,700 100% 6.0 
*t-test, significant at 1%  
Considering the three categories previously outlined (according to the Pew Research, Kummar-Schulte 
and Google classifications), the results do not change. Both in the case of apps that require at least one 
sensitive permission, and in all other cases, the average number of requested permissions is markedly 
higher when the apps can be downloaded for free. As a consequence, the provision of an app for free 
implies the ceding, through the user’s acceptance of the conditions outlined in the permissions, of a 
greater amount of digital data, particularly those regarding users’ sensitive information.  In turns, an 
implicit exchange emerges between users and internet platforms, that affects the primary commercial 
relationship concerning the purchase and sale of apps, and that implies that the free access to an app is 
associated to the user’s consent to a higher number of permissions, particularly to those related to the 
disclosure of personal data. 
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In addition, it emerges that the most downloaded apps are those featuring a higher number of 
permissions; apps showing over 100,000 downloads require on average 2.5 more permissions compared 
to apps downloaded between 10,001 and 100,000 times, and 3 more permissions compared to apps 
downloaded between 1001 and 10,0000 times. Considering apps downloaded over 100 million times, the 
average number of their permissions rises to 20, slightly less than 4 times the average amount (6.0 
permissions). 
The number of downloads represents a valid proxy of the users’ demand for apps; the distribution of 
downloads, according to whether the apps are free or not, shows some differences. As it was easy to 
imagine, free apps show a higher number of downloads. More than 80% of paid apps are indeed 
downloaded from 1 up to 100 times, whereas for free apps, such figure reaches around 45%5. 
4. Econometric models and results 
Exploiting econometric tools, we detected some insights about users’ (demand side) and developers’ (supply 
side) reactions to the number and the typologies of permissions required by apps. For both sides, we 
propose an econometric analysis composed of three models estimated according to the above-mentioned 
permissions classification; the first one takes into consideration the Pew Research classification; the 
second one the Kummer and Schulte’s one, while the last model adopts the classification implemented 
by Google. 
As concerns the analysis of the apps demand, a linear regression (OLS) has been estimated, modelling the 
demand for apps in terms of downloads as a function of the permissions that they require on a set of 
control variables for each app such as the price, the category, the average rating, the number of reviews 
and the app developer. 
The econometric model is as follows: 
 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑' = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷' + 𝜃𝑋' + 𝜖' 
where the dependent variable (Demand) is represented by the logarithm of the total number of downloads 
for a generic app i, Xi includes the control variables, Di is a dummy variable linked with each permission 
considered in the proposed classification and, finally, 𝜖' represent the classic error term. 
Parameter 𝛽 is of utmost interest due to its association to the vector of dummy variables that represent 
each permission; if the estimated parameter appears to be significant and negative, as expected, that 
implies that the presence of permissions sensitive to individual data leads to a reduction in the demand.  
                                               
5 The downloads trend shows to what extent the long-tail theory is also valid for the apps market; in fact, setting aside the 
distinction between paid and non-paid apps, about 50% of the apps is downloaded less than 100 times, and about 98% less 
than 100,000 times. This shows how just a few apps, i.e. 2% (the long-tail), have been installed by a considerable number of 
users. A total of 6 apps has been installed more than 1,000,000,000 times; Facebook, Google Gmail, YouTube, Google Maps, 
Google Search and Google Play services, with an average number of permissions equal to 43.5. 
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The results (Table 3) confirm the presence of a negative and significant direct effect of the number and 
typologies of permissions on the number of downloads. This relation can be also detected in Model C, 
in which we consider a more detailed and specific classification of permission, as suggested by Kummer 
and Schulte.  
Table 4: demand model (OLS models) 
Dependent variable: log. of installations 
Model A:                           
Pew Research 
classification 
Model B:         
Google 
classification 
Model C:                       
Kummer and 
Schulte 
User information permissions -0.05***                  
 (0.00)                  
Dangeorus permissions  -0.01***                 
  (0.00)                 
Full Internet access permissions   0.07*** 
   (0.00)    
View network state permissions   -0.13*** 
   (0.00)    
Phone state permissions (read phone state and ID)   0.07*** 
   (0.00)    
Location permissions (Gps)   -0.05*** 
   (0.00)    
Communication permissions (read sms, intercept outgoing calls, 
ecc.) 
  -0.10*** 
   (0.00)    
Users profile permissions   -0.02*** 
   (0.00)    
Other permissions   -0.06*** 
   (0.01)    
Constant 1.95*** 1.92*** 2.00*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)    
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Categories Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.84 0.84 0.84 
# of observations 1,135,700 1,135,700 1,135,700 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in brackets. ***, **, * significantly different from 0 at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively 
With regards to the analysis of the supply side, we focus on apps price; as seen above, the descriptive 
statistics show a clear difference in the average number of permissions between paid apps and free apps. 
With the econometric analysis, we provide rigorous evidence in support of the assumption that business 
models adopted by developers are systematically affected by choices concerning the number and type of 
permission that users would have to accept when downloading the app. 
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To this purpose, we estimate a probabilistic model in order to take into account the business model 
adopted by the developers via a dichotomous variable which is equal to 1 if an app is paid and to 0 if not.  
The model is as follows: 
 Pr(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒' = 1) = Λ[𝛼 + 𝛽𝐷' + 𝜃𝑋' + 𝜖'] 
 
Also in this case, the parameter of greatest interest is represented by 𝛽 which, combined with the dummy 
variable (D), identifies whether a permission can be considered as relevant in terms of transfer of 
individuals’ data; 𝜖' is the classical error term.  
The presence of permissions sensitive to individual data requested by an app (among those which collect 
individuals’ data) reduces the likelihood that the application presents a price higher than 0. Table 5 shows 
the results of the estimation of the three models, in analogy with the analysis conducted on the demand. 
The results also show that, on the supply side, a significant and negative relationship emerges between 
the number and the type of permissions and the probability that the app is not offered for free on the 
app store. 
Table 5: supply model (probit models) 
Dependent variable: APPs price 
Model A:                            
Pew Research 
classification 
Model B:          
Google 
classification 
Model C:                       
Kummer and 
Schulte 
User information permissions -0.26***   
 (0.00)   
Dangeorus permissions  -0.67***  
  (0.00)  
Full Internet access permissions   -0.41*** 
   (0.01)    
View network state permissions   -0.55*** 
   (0.00)    
Phone state permissions (read phone state and ID)   0.09*** 
   (0.00)    
Location permissions (Gps)   -0.30*** 
   (0.01)    
Communication permissions (read sms, intercept outgoing calls, 
ecc.) 
  0.01    
   (0.01)    
Users profile permissions   -0.00    
   (0.01)    
Other permissions   -0.03    
   (0.02)    
Constant -0.33*** 0.08** 0.29*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)    
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Categories Yes Yes Yes 
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Adjusted R2 0.14 0.16 0.21 
# of observations 1,135,700 1,135,700 1,135,700 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in brackets. ***, **, * significantly different from 0 at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively 
A more interesting result emerges from the interpretation of these outcomes as a whole. In fact, in 
addition to the significance of the estimates, a weak magnitude effect (or elasticity) of permissions 
appears, both on the demand and supply side.   
These results suggest that, even if consumers were plunged in a hypothetical “nearly perfect market” 
configuration in which buyers and sellers avail of complete information about a particular product, thus 
being very easy to compare prices as well as the specific characteristics of different apps (with particular 
attention to the number and the typology of the permissions required), things would not work as they 
should. Indeed, both buyers and sellers are aware that access to digital services implicitly implies an 
exchange of data (significance of the coefficient	𝛽), although this does not have considerable impact (as 
it happens instead in the classical goods markets) neither on the level of downloads (demand), nor on 
the level of the prices (supply). In other words, the implicit nature of this exchange does not allow market 
indicators to work efficiently. 
On the one hand, individuals’ behavior, as mentioned in previous sections, is affected by bounded 
rationality. In such context, where a consumer purchase requires relatively low efforts in terms of money, 
time, physical and mental commitment, and the price - in particular its low level - does not appear to be 
the decisive factor in consumer choices, impulsive behaviors often materialize (Bayley & Nancarrow, 
1998; Rook & Fisher, 1995; Rook & Hoch, 1985; Stern, 1962). The easier to buy a good, especially in 
terms of price affordability, the higher the chance of making an impulsive purchase, as choices are 
hedonically complex and more emotional than rational. 
On the other hand, in a digital environment, a number of conditions may ease “impulsive” choices by 
users. Users’ online choices are much more versatile than what is suggested by the “rationality” 
hypothesis, often because online shopping is associated with a hedonic experience, in which purchasing 
choices have a reduced time horizon (Moe, 2003). These contexts make the user less focused on the 
purchase decision process, so that this latter appears to be more stimulus-driven than goal-driven. 
Such aspect may also explain why, from the app store point of view, the algorithm used to suggest apps 
to users is based on a set of information (the number of downloads reached, as well as the app rating) 
that is able to influence impulsive purchases. Therefore, if faced with the right type of stimulus, the 
probability that a consumer makes an impulse purchase becomes higher. Moreover, while under the 
rational paradigm the purchase is planned to the smallest details, and often this requires time, in the digital 
environment, the relevant conditions allow consumers to make a purchase immediately. Many customers 
are conscious of what they are doing (an impulsive purchase), but this represents the way in which they 
reconcile utilitarian and hedonic factors affecting the online surfing experience (Akram et al., 2017). 
In this paper, however, we put forward another and more structural mechanism favoring impulsive 
behavior and inefficient market outcomes, i.e. the implicit nature of these transactions. In our viewpoint, 
it is indeed the very nature of the current functioning of the digital ecosystem, in which no formal data 
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transaction emerges (so that economic indicators, e.g. prices, that normally regulate markets, are ruled 
out), that prevents the emergence of socially efficient outcomes.  
5. Policy considerations 
In the data-driven context, data are essential to enable AI: those stemming from online services represent 
one of the most relevant catalysts capable to record and analyze the characteristics of the environment 
surrounding individuals, as well as the way in which these latter move within it and the interaction 
between them in a certain dimension, ultimately converting such data into essential assets through which 
AI systems can be trained. 
Indeed, as Tirole affirms, in the digital environment, data have increasingly taken on a value comparable 
to that of money: «People often argue that platforms should pay for the data we give them. In practice, 
many sites do pay. This payment does not take the form of a financial transfer, but rather of services 
provided free of charge. We provide our personal data in exchange either for useful services (search 
engines, social networks, instant messaging, online video, maps, email) or in the course of a commercial 
transaction (as in the case of Uber and Airbnb). Online businesses can often argue that they have spent 
money to acquire our data. […] As data is at the heart of value creation, defining rules governing its use 
is an urgent task.» (Tirole, 2017, p. 399). 
In particular, in this paper we have shown, through an empirical investigation into big data – considered 
as an essential asset with a view to AI – that market failures are intrinsic to the very nature of digital 
transactions, and that traditional policies do not therefore apply to the digital context.  
As a matter of fact, EU law currently provides consumer protection tools when it comes to B2C relations 
characterized by the provision of goods or services upon payment of a monetary amount to the platform. 
Key reference provisions – currently under review – addressing the terms and modalities of the monetary 
transactions between consumers and undertakings, including platforms, are indeed currently provided by 
Directive 93/13 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (European Council, 1993), Directive 98/6/EC 
on consumer protection in the indication of the prices of products offered to consumers, Directive 
2005/29 on unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market (European 
Parliament and of the Council, 2005)6 and Directive 2011/83 on consumer rights (European Parliament 
and European Council, 2011). 
Nevertheless, when consumers obtain, in a digital environment, services in exchange for their data – 
therefore without a corresponding payment of monetary value – the mentioned provisions do not 
provide complete protection to individuals vis à vis online platforms. Since there are currently no rules 
protecting individuals obtaining digital content against counter-performances of non-monetary nature 
(such as data transfers), this regulatory gap could be interpreted by undertakings as an incentive to move 
                                               
6 This Directive has indeed to be read in conjunction with the guidance provided in 2016 by the Commission on its 
implementation which recognises that « data-driven business structures are becoming predominant in the online world. In particular, online 
platforms analyse, process and sell data related to consumer preferences and other user-generated content. This, together with advertising, often 
constitutes their main source of revenues» – COM (2016) 320 final (European Commission, 2016). 
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towards business models whose distinctive feature is the supply of digital goods or services without there 
being any relevant monetary transaction (European Parliament and the Council, 2015, para. 13). 
In tight relation with such emerging awareness, an example could be provided of how the EU legislator, 
starting with the 2015 Digital Single Market Strategy, has commenced looking at data in the context of 
new markets, adjacent to the traditional electronic communications as well as audio-visual media ones, 
trying to capture brand-new data-related dynamics via tailored soft-touch legislative interventions, with a 
view not to hampering innovation, while protecting though fundamental goods within the EU legal order. 
In this respect, a Directive proposal has been tabled “on certain aspects concerning contracts for the 
supply of digital content”7, which covers not only monetary payments, but also payments made in terms 
of personal or other types of data provided by consumers in exchange for services, establishing that the 
termination of the contract for lack of conformity of the digital content implies that the supplier shall 
reimburse the price paid by the consumer or, if this latter’s counter-performance consisted in the 
provision of data, the same supplier shall refrain from using such data and any other information which 
the consumer has provided in exchange for the digital content (article 13).8  
This proposal may be a first step in the right direction. However, on the background of the results and 
considerations contained in this paper, it is reasonable to affirm that policies should first identify what is 
the “black box” to examine, meaning the expected perimeter of any prospective regulatory intervention 
in the context of data-related transactions, and then the subjects entrusted to monitor data transactions 
between individuals and platforms. The idea appears indeed inaccurate that transactional distortions 
could simply be sorted out through enhanced transparency obligations: such distortions would indeed 
still feature transactions, as long as strong and structural asymmetric information issues cannot be wiped 
out by simple transparency rules and individuals are characterized by bounded rationality. The individuals’ 
impulsiveness in the provision of their own data would indeed stay, due to the marked information 
asymmetry as to such data value and their potential primary and secondary uses, leading individuals not 
to weigh in costs and benefits associated to data transactions and disregard their consequences. Overall, 
these mechanisms lead to socially inefficient outcomes, where a disproportionate amount of individual 
data is used for commercial businesses.  
 
  
                                               
7 With a view to enhancing cross-border trade in the Union, the mentioned proposal couples with the 2017 amended proposal 
for a Directive on certain aspects concerning contracts for the sales of goods, amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council and Directive 2009/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and 
repealing Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council. Both proposals, on the background of the 
political agreement reached last January on this whole legislative package, should soon be formally adopted. 
8 Article 16 «also provides that the supplier shall refrain from using data and any other information which the consumer has 
provided in exchange for the digital content» (European Parliament and the Council, 2015, sec. 13; 16). 
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